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ETHICS AND THE PERFECT MORAL LAW1 
Harry Bunting 
Summary 
This paper examines contemporary virtue ethics and the claim that Christian 
ethics is a virtue ethic. Three central theses are identified as being central to 
virtue ethics: a priority thesis, a perfectionist thesis and a communitarian 
thesis. It is argued that defences of the priority thesis—it best addresses the 
moral crisis in our society, it does justice to historical consciousness and it 
remedies the incompleteness in deontic ethics—are unconvincing. It is argued 
that virtue and moral perfection are best understood in terms of psychologically 
appropriate dispositions to act in accordance with moral principles. It is further 
argued that the communitarian thesis raises relativist difficulties and fails to do 
justice to the universal elements of morality. Each of these arguments is 
developed philosophically and the implications for Christian ethics are 
explored. In light of the theory of virtue sketched in the paper it is concluded 
that the independence thesis, upon which virtue ethics rests, is untenable and 
that an examination of the structure of the universal moral principles 
underlying the Christian faith remains the proper subject matter for Christian 
ethics. 
I. Introduction 
It is recorded in Holy Scripture that when God told the prophet Samuel to 
anoint a King of Israel from amongst the sons of Jesse the Bethlehemite, 
seven of Jesse’s sons were considered and all seven rejected. 
Unexpectedly, God instructed Samuel to appoint as King the youngest son
—David—because, we read: ‘man looks on the outward appearance, but 
the Lord looks on the heart’ (1 Sa. 16:7). 
At an early point in the unfolding of God’s purposes, therefore, we 
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are introduced to a moral distinction between appearance and reality, 
between an outward self and an inward self which is the true self; and we 
are cautioned that it is the inner self which is of primary moral importance. 
The distinction between how people appear and how they truly are appears 
again and again in Scripture; it is prominent both in modern and in ancient 
culture, and it is a distinction which is as central to common sense as to 
academic reflection. At the level of common sense the distinction appears 
when we reflect on the multiplicity of motives, good and bad, which may 
be behind apparently identical actions; and it is most keenly felt when we 
encounter hypocrisy in others or in ourselves. The distinction provides one 
of the grand themes of fiction, the delicious details of whose infinite 
permutations have fascinated countless generations of dramatists and 
novelists. I am led to believe that it is a favourite theme in existentialist 
literature where it takes various forms, chiefly a flight from ‘mauvaise foi’ 
and a quest for authenticity. Since 1999 is the centenary of the publication 
of The Interpretation of Dreams, we should not forget that it is a 
distinction in which Freud also was intensely interested. 
An emphasis on the moral significance of inner character is of importance 
to our present purposes for two inter-related reasons. Firstly, a stress on 
inner character as opposed to outward action is a prominent feature of 
contemporary philosophical ethics where the emphasis has given rise, in 
recent decades, to the emergence of the school which is called ‘virtue 
ethics’; and thereby has been responsible, if confident voices are to be 
believed, for the most significant restructuring of the general contours of 
ethical theory in the modern period. The stress on duty and obligation 
which is the hallmark of ‘modern ethics’ from Hobbes to Rawls is to be 
replaced by a stress on character; deontic terms give way to aretic. In the 
first place, then, an emphasis on character has promised to open up a new 
agenda in philosophical ethics. 
Secondly, and building on this first point, an emphasis on inner character is 
important because of the widespread conviction, in Christian academic 
circles, that Christian ethics is a virtue ethic.2 
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Stated informally, it is claimed that there are biblical and theological 
foundations for the claim that character is the primary focus in Christian 
ethics. The moral perfection of Jesus and His role for believers as master 
and guide, the centrality of the doctrine of sanctification, the stress on the 
communal nature of the moral development of the believer: the existence 
of these and other themes has convinced some recent writers that Christian 
ethics is a virtue ethic. Our purpose, therefore, is to consider this thesis. 
A preliminary clarification is necessary at this point. I have mentioned the 
stress upon character in contemporary virtue ethics, suggesting that this 
distinguishes virtue ethics from deontological ethics. However, whatever 
distinction we may draw between deontic and virtue ethics, it cannot be 
drawn quite as simply as this because writers in the deontological tradition 
such as Kant are extremely interested in character and virtue-theorists such 
as Aquinas are extremely interested in moral principles. Some alternative 
account of the issues is called for; some more substantive account of the 
distinction between deontic and aretic ethics is needed as a framework 
within which to discuss the claim that Christian ethics is a virtue ethic. 
Perhaps there are as many forms of virtue ethics as there are defenders of 
that point of view. Nevertheless, some common themes run through classic 
expositions of the position. The fundamental contentions of virtue ethics 
appear to be threefold: 
(1) A priority thesis: aretic and deontic terms are irreducible and the former 
are of prior moral significance; Christian moral theory primarily involves 
aretic terms.  
(2) A perfectionist thesis: ethics, and Christian ethics in particular, are 
centrally concerned with the perfection of character; all other moral 
concepts are derivable from the concept of a morally paradigmatic person. 
(3) A communitarian thesis: all moral virtues, including Christian virtues 
are intelligible only within the context of culture-specific or historic-
specific communities or traditions. 
Christian virtue ethics amounts, in brief, to a priority thesis, a perfectionist 
thesis and a communitarian thesis. In assessing the central claim that 
Christian ethics is a virtue ethic I propose, therefore, to examine these 
theses in turn and to attempt to form a judgement as to whether and to 
what extent these central claims are true. 
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II. The Priority Thesis 
I have characterised virtue theory as a priority thesis. It is important to 
note, however, that it can take stronger and weaker forms. On the weak 
version virtue theory merely involves an independence thesis, to the effect 
that aretic and deontic terms are independent of each other and that an 
independent understanding of each is of importance to ethics. The 
independence thesis is the philosophical foundation of much virtue theory, 
so if my later arguments call into question the independence thesis then 
either virtue ethics will have to be rejected or its significance sought in 
very different quarters. 
In its earliest formulations, in the work of Anscombe and MacIntyre, virtue 
ethics took the form of a stronger, redundancy, thesis.3 On this view 
deontic ethics gives rise to interminable and inconclusive argument 
concerning moral dilemmas; or it presupposes the fiction of a divine law-
giver, a theological context which no longer has cultural relevance. For 
these reasons, it is argued, it is best replaced by an ethic of character which 
takes the cultivation of character as its central concern. These contentions 
are highly questionable. There is little agreement concerning moral 
dilemmas amongst defenders of virtue ethics; it is unclear why deontic 
terms necessarily require a theological context and it is even more unclear 
that theology is culturally irrelevant. For these reasons I am not persuaded 
by the redundancy thesis. 
More common is the intermediate position priority thesis, which grants a 
role to deontic principles but argues that aretic considerations take priority 
over them. Defenders of this form of virtue ethics would concede that 
moral principles have an important role in morality— they may and often 
do function in guiding our conduct. However, they do so only because they 
summarise, or generalise the decisions of ideal moral exemplars. When 
principles no longer play a useful role, for example when they conflict and 
give rise to moral dilemmas, the true nature of moral theory is revealed: 
what should be done is what a morally perfect person would do in the 
circumstances. The important point is that moral rules and principles 
possess no independent moral significance. 
Unlike deontic theories, then, virtue ethics recognises the importance of 
virtuous character. This seems to be its central, and 
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most important insight and it is an insight which underpins all of the 
various forms, moderate or radical, which virtue ethics currently takes. 
Rather than pursue virtue ethics as an abstract philosophical theory, 
however, let us examine it as it appears in a Christian context, taking as an 
example of such an approach the recent book by J.J. Kotva, The Christian 
Case for Virtue Ethics.4 
Central to Kotva’s theory is the distinction with which I introduced this 
paper: that between modern ethics and virtue ethics. Modern ethics is 
concerned with ‘rules, principles, goods and step-by- step decision making 
procedures for resolving moral quandaries’ and for ‘determining the moral 
status of specific acts’.5 Virtue ethics, by contrast will follow Aquinas’ 
conviction that ‘Christian moral reflection profits from the adoption of an 
Aristotelian framework’,6 and is centrally concerned with agent-centred 
issues: its teleological structure describes human nature as it is, the ‘telos’ 
or the end which it could be and the qualities of character, themselves 
internally related to the end, necessary to effect the transition from the 
former to the latter. 
A substantial part of Kotva’s book is devoted to documenting the central 
role which virtue plays in Christian ethics. The chapters which 
demonstrate the centrality of virtue to theological and biblical themes are 
detailed and, irrespective of any philosophical conclusion which may 
finally be drawn on Kotva’s project, these sections are impressive 
demonstrations of the centrality of character and virtue to Christian moral 
life. When exploring specifically theological material, Kotva’s treats of 
concepts such as sanctification and Christology. Drawing on the work of 
writers such as Erikson, Macquarrie and Berkof, Kotva shows that 
sanctification involves a process of personal eschatology in which, as 
virtues such as love, joy and peace are cultivated, the character of the 
believer is transformed into the likeness of Christ. Central to Christian 
virtue we also find a distinctive moral interpretation of Christology. Jesus’ 
question: ‘who do you say that I am?’ (Mt. 16:15), is not an historical or a 
metaphysical question, Kotva claims; on the contrary, it is a moral 
question. The incarnation involves a unique disclosure of God’s nature and 
so basic moral virtues gain an authoritative expression in the context of the 
life 
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and teaching of Jesus.  
In a similar vein Kotva explores biblical connections to virtue. 
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Themes such as the importance of the inner life, the perfectionist moral 
example and the master-disciple relationship are all documented in detail 
in the Gospel narrative and in the Pauline writings. In all of these ways 
Kotva succeeds in demonstrating the presence, in Christian tradition, of 
themes which are centrally concerned with virtue. 
When assessing the significance of this textual and theological evidence 
we must make a distinction, of the first importance, between two theses: 
(1) a moral thesis: Christian ethics involves the cultivation of certain moral 
and theological virtues, and  
(2) a philosophical thesis: Christian ethics is a virtue ethic. 
To show that (1) and (2) are distinct it is sufficient to point out that the 
truth of (2) commits one to holding the independence thesis whereas the 
truth of (1) entails no such commitments. 
If this distinction is kept in mind then Kotva’s case in the central chapters 
of the book collapses because his carefully documented evidence is 
evidence only for the truth of (1), not evidence for the truth of (2). This 
central point can be grasped if we approach the issue from a different point 
of view. Suppose that we documented from Scripture and from theology 
the importance of law to divine-human relations, finding it central to God’s 
covenant relations with the Jews and in the ‘new covenant’ which the 
Gospel era introduces. Would this establish that Christian ethics is a 
contractarian version of a deontological ethic? Or does the prominence of 
the ideal of beneficence in the Christian life establish that Christian ethics 
is a version of consequentialism? If the answer to these questions is ‘yes’ 
then Christian ethics could be shown to embrace contradictory ethical 
systems. 
It is clear therefore that the moral and philosophical theses which I 
outlined are logically distinct. No doubt Christian ethics encompasses a 
variety of virtues but it does not follow from this that Christian ethics is a 
virtue ethic. The virtues which feature in the Christian life can be analysed 
in a variety of ways and which of these ways is correct is a philosophical 
rather than a textual question. 
It should be clear then that two things are needed to establish that Christian 
ethics is a virtue ethic: firstly an account of the nature of a virtue which 
provides a basis for distinguishing between virtue ethics and deontological 
ethics; and secondly an argument which shows the greater interpretative 
explanatory power for Christianity of virtue ethics. At no stage does Kotva 
proceed in this way and his project is 
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seriously flawed as a result. He simply believes that the presence of 
references to virtue in Scripture and theology establishes that Christianity 
is a virtue ethic and this is insufficient to establish his case. 
What Kotva does do, however, is to offer moral and philosophical 
arguments for accepting virtue ethics and since the arguments in question 
are so widely used and are in some quarters influential I shall look at them 
in some detail. 
According to Kotva virtue ethics is philosophically preferable for the 
Christian for three principal reasons: it can best address the problems 
posed by the moral crisis in our society, it can best do justice to the rise of 
historical consciousness and it remedies the incompleteness which 
characterises modern theories. 
The crisis to which Kotva refers in the first argument, and which virtue 
ethics is designed to remedy, is a moral and spiritual crisis: the institution 
of the family is in jeopardy, levels of violence are rising, social order is 
collapsing. For those, like myself, who are unclear as to why an 
acceptance of virtue ethics will remedy the crisis, rather than for example a 
revival of Kantian reverence for the moral law, Kotva has two answers. 
Firstly, virtue ethics can best address the crisis because it ‘recognises that 
worthy companions and role models are vital to the development of 
virtuous character’.7 Secondly, the ‘moral bankruptcy’ which we deplore in 
our society derives from an emphasis on an ideal of individual authenticity 
which involves people being ‘free to give themselves over to undisciplined 
urges and felt needs’ at the expense of virtuous citizenry.8 Kotva’s 
characterisation of deontic ethics at this point is suggestive of egoistic, 
hedonistic and perhaps amoral personal self-indulgence which he urges us 
to set aside in favour of a more socially responsible ethic. 
An initial response must be to challenge the prejudicial terms in which 
Kotva proposes to conduct the debate between modern, deontic ethics and 
virtue ethics. What in particular is the connection between modern ethics 
and Kotva’s conception of individual autonomy? 
Kotva’s strategy is to contrast hedonistic individualism with an ideal of 
other-regarding communal citizenship, identify deontic ethics with the 
former and virtue ethics with the latter, and then ask us to 
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choose whom we will serve. This is an unacceptable way to conduct a 
philosophical debate. The ideals of hedonistic individualism and 
communal citizenship can both be interpreted along the lines of either 
deontic ethics (principles) or virtue ethics (dispositions of character). To 
portray deontic ethics as necessarily hedonistic is a misleading strategy. 
Kant’s ethics with its stress on imperfect obligations and respect for 
persons as ends in themselves seems very remote from the egoistic 
caricature which Kotva has drawn. Mill devotes a significant part of the 
second chapter of Utilitarianism to distancing utilitarianism from this 
hedonistic egoism.9 
Nor, unless we have forgotten Adam Smith’s ideal observer, can we deny 
modern ethics access to theoretical role models. It may be that virtue ethics 
assigns a role to the concept of a morally perfect person which differs from 
that assigned to it in familiar consequentialist or rationalist theories. But 
even here the contrast should not be exaggerated. Kant talks a great deal 
about a morally pure will and Mill often invokes the notion of a perfectly 
impartial and beneficent person. There is no reason in principle, therefore, 
why modern theories are excluded from using the theoretical construct of 
an ideal role model. Kotva is right to stress that within Christian ethics the 
moral role model takes a particularly concrete form. However, since it is 
the theoretical interpretation of Christian ethics which is at stake in the 
present argument we cannot appeal to the life of Christ in support of one or 
other of these theories. 
Secondly, virtue theory and modern ethics are contrasted by reference to 
the rise in historical consciousness; the former, but not the latter, we are 
told, enjoy ‘historical consciousness’ and so recognise the pervasiveness of 
social change and the moral sensitivity appropriate to it. Virtue ethics 
recognises, Kotva argues that ‘we are historical creatures, situated in 
specific and cultural contexts with particular beliefs, practices and 
commitments. All knowledge, including moral knowledge, is historically 
grounded and at some level informed by the setting from within which it is 
known.’ The consequences that Kotva draws from this, by way of criticism 
of modern ethics, are firstly that context is important for ethics and 
secondly that it is ‘almost impossible’ to view moral rules as ‘purely 
objective and unchanging’.10 
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At this point, once again, the characterisation of modern ethics is suspect. 
Contrary to Kotva, consequentialist and rationalist theories do not ignore 
context and can adjust perfectly well to social change. Consider, firstly, 
technological change. Modern forms of communication mean that we now 
have knowledge of poverty- stricken parts of the world which our 
ancestors knew nothing about; modern developments in agricultural 
technology and modern forms of transport mean that western industrial 
countries have it within their power to help poor countries in ways which 
hitherto were not available. Consequentialists and Kantians would happily 
agree that obligations can change in the light of historical developments 
such as these. Secondly, reflect on the multitude of ways in which context 
can alter moral realities at a single period of time. People who live in 
desert conditions obviously have different water-conservation obligations 
than do people who live in countries where there is a ready supply of 
running water. Consequentialists and Kantian theorists can easily 
accommodate the contextual constraints which varying circumstances 
place upon our obligations. 
What may lend plausibility to Kotva’s criticisms of modern ethics is a 
distinct and erroneous conception of the way in which moral principles 
feature in moral theory. According to this conception moral principles are 
absolute and are restricted to specific and contextually defined actions. If 
this were so then indeed a principle based morality would be insensitive to 
context and historical change. However, as I have argued, modern moral 
theories are structured around principles—Kant’s principle of respect for 
persons and the consequentialist beneficence principle come readily to 
mind—which are highly general and which transcend specific cultural 
contexts. They are able, therefore, to accommodate social change and 
historical context in ways which Kotva has not considered possible. 
Kotva’s third and final reason for preferring virtue ethics is that it remedies 
the incompleteness—or the partial picture of the moral life—which we 
find in deontological ethics. The alleged inability to account for friendship 
and other personal aspects of morality life are particularly highlighted and 
it is claimed that virtue ethics possesses superior resources for dealing with 
these problems. 
As is well known the problem of the partiality of human affections is 
particularly acute for consequentialists. If we agree with Mill that ‘as 
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him 
(the utilitarian) to be as strictly impartial as a 
BUNTING: Ethics and the Perfect Moral Law 245 
disinterested and benevolent spectator’,11 then it seems that relationships—
for example to friends, to family, to nation—which are fundamental to 
common-sense morality are beyond the moral pale and moral agents are 
required to act so as to maximise impersonal utility whatever the 
individual cost. 
I have two comments to make on this argument. Firstly, a striking feature 
of modern philosophising is the resourcefulness which consequentialists 
have shown in reacting to the problem of personal relations. An early 
strategy was to move from Benthamite utilitarianism in the direction of a 
pluralist account which held that goodness was, in Mills’ words, ‘a 
concrete whole’ whose ‘ingredients’ included such things as friendship, 
music, health, power and fame.12 A second, more recent, step has been to 
reject utilitarian hedonism and to adopt, in Peter Railton’s words ‘a 
pluralist approach in which several goods are viewed as intrinsically, non-
morally valuable—such as happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, 
autonomy, solidarity, respect and beauty’.13 
However, by far the most popular approach has been to keep 
consequentialist justification separate from motivation, the general idea 
being that there is a consequentialist justification for having non- 
consequentialist motivations, namely that having them is the best means to 
the end of value maximisation.14 This is not the place to discuss in detail 
the merits of these and other possible defences of consequentialism, 
especially since Kotva ignores the existence of such well known defences 
of utilitarian friendship as the ones that I have mentioned. Suffice it to say 
that, in the light of familiar arguments we cannot dismiss modern ethics on 
the simple grounds that it is incapable of accommodating the common-
sense ethics of friendship. 
My second point is this. Is friendship not a problem also for virtue ethics? 
Whether one should save a drowning member of one’s own family or save 
three strangers is a quandary for consequentialists but it is equally unclear 
what a perfectly virtuous person would do in the circumstances. And does 
the consequentialist response in terms of promoting a multiplicity of goods 
not seem remarkably like a 
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description of the constraints under which a perfectly good person would 
decide on the appropriate course of action in such cases? 
At least two conclusions follow. Firstly, Kotva has not given convincing 
reasons to accept his radical conclusions: modern ethics has the resources 
with which to deal with the problems which he raises. Secondly, although 
Kotva’s intention is to emphasise the contrast between modern ethics and 
virtue ethics what impresses one most is the continuities between the two. 
This second point is worth developing in a little more detail. 
Kotva’s defence of virtue ethics is based on developing a series of 
contrasts between virtue ethics and deontological ethics and arguing in 
each case that across a range of problems virtue ethics provided preferable 
accounts of our moral convictions. What I have argued, however, is that 
none of these arguments are successful. On close examination it is the 
parallels and not the contrasts which strike us. Thus a recovery of a proper 
deontic ethic is as likely to overcome the modern crisis as is an aretic 
ethic; deontic and aretic ethics can both do justice to context and cultural 
change; they can equally well account for friendship and the personal. Far 
from opening up a gap between the two forms of ethics we discover how 
closely related they are. How significant, therefore, is the gap between 
deontic and aretic moralities? Is there a gap at all? This is something which 
we must now question. 
According to Kotva virtues are stable affective and intellectual dispositions 
which contribute to human good and they manifest themselves in actions 
performed primarily for their own sakes. Suppose however that a moral 
agent has a stable disposition to act out of respect for moral principles 
which contribute to the human good. Are these different affective and 
intellectual states or are they different ways of describing one and the same 
state? We shall make it more concrete by considering a specific virtue, 
namely veracity and examining the relationship between virtues and 
principles. Suppose that the first person possesses the virtue of truthfulness 
and the second person has a stable disposition to act in accordance with the 
moral principle: ‘one ought to be truthful’. Wherein does the moral 
difference lie? If there is no difference at all then a central plank on which 
virtue ethics rests has been removed. 
G.J. Warnock states: 
If it were agreed that we have here (that is, in the disposition to non- maleficence, fairness, 
beneficence and non-deception) four moral virtues, it 
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could scarcely be contentious to derive from this the proposition that we have here, by the 
same token, four fundamental moral standards or moral principles.15 
Warnock’s argument invites one to conclude that virtue ethics is simply the 
mirror image of the ethical theories based on principles. 
As yet we have some way to go, however, because a person who possessed 
a settled disposition to behave on a principle enjoining truthfulness but 
who was truthful for the wrong reasons—for example out of fear or in 
pursuit of reputation would not be displaying a moral virtue. To be a 
virtuous person the disposition must be truthfulness for its own sake. With 
a suitably enriched psychology the gap between acting virtuously and 
acting on principles is beginning to shrink. More, however, needs to be 
said. 
We might again imagine two people both of whom have a disposition to 
act for the sake of truthfulness, but with this important difference. The first 
person did so spontaneously and joyfully, whereas the second person did 
so grudgingly and reluctantly. Clearly we would not regard the second 
person’s behaviour as truly virtuous. 
Building on this we can see how the gap between virtue and principles has 
all but disappeared. Consider any virtue. If a person possesses a settled 
disposition, joyfully and spontaneously to act for the sake of the moral 
principles associated with that virtue, then that person possesses the virtue 
in question. A moral virtue, then, is simply a suitably motivated disposition 
to act for the sake of moral principles. This being the case it is not 
surprising that we detected strong parallels between deontic and aretic 
responses to the issues which we were exploring in our earlier discussions; 
virtues and principles are different ways of talking of the same thing, 
different ways of characterising the same aspect of moral reality. 
III. The Perfectionist Thesis 
The second form which the ethics of character takes is a stress on the 
importance of the concept of moral perfection. Here again, it is claimed, 
philosophy and Christian theory converge: at a purely philosophical level 
virtue ethics transcends deontic ethics, its insights extending to Christian 
ethics partly as a consequence of the philosophical theory and partly as an 
exposition of neglected aspects 
15 G.J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1971), pp. 71-72. 
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of Christian tradition and Christian experience. Since the concept of an 
authoritative, morally perfect exemplar is notably absent from modern 
moral theory, and since it plays such a conspicuous role in Christian ethics, 
the project is neither contrived nor fanciful. 
Prominent amongst recent philosophers who have stressed the importance 
of moral paradigms have been Alisdair MacIntyre, Lawrence Blum, and 
Harold Alderman.16 Their purely philosophical exposition of the concept of 
a moral exemplar typically gives rise to two main claims: that paradigms 
are primary in moral theory and that narrative is the proper form of moral 
deliberation. These theses are clearly and forcefully developed in the 
article by Harold Alderman to which I have referred and it is his exposition 
of perfectionism which I shall follow. 
Firstly, Alderman argues that in moral theory moral paradigms are primary, 
and goods and rules, if they have a place at all, are secondary. 
Philosophical reasoning necessarily takes something as given; something 
upon which all other explanations and justifications are based, and beyond 
which there is no appeal. Instead of appealing (as do consequentialists) to 
goods or appealing (as do Kantians) to rules, virtue theorists argue that we 
learn how to act by acting and that we learn how to behave properly by 
simply observing proper behaviour. From this it follows that moral goods 
and moral principles take, at best, second place. 
Consider the status of moral goods. Alderman concedes that since the 
paradigmatic individual is taken to be the highest good, any account of 
paradigms ultimately presupposes a theory of goodness. However the 
status of the paradigm is necessarily of a different logical order from any 
specific good because in connection with any other good, be it happiness 
or knowledge or beauty, there are some circumstances under which the 
good is morally undesirable whereas there are no circumstances in which 
paradigmatic character is morally undesirable. Consider next the status of 
rules. It is by imitation, by watching an exemplar, that we learn how to do 
skilful things such as dancing and cooking. It follows, therefore, that since 
being moral means learning how to do the right thing morally, learning 
how to be moral is strictly like learning how to do other things. Rules, 
then, are secondary because they are not strictly necessary in learning to be 
16 See L. Blum, ‘Moral Exemplars’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988), 196-221; H. 
Alderman, ‘By Virtue of a Virtue’, Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982), 127-53. 
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moral. Mere knowledge of rules, therefore, is not enough. Neither a moral 
agent nor a social anthropologist can find out what is right merely by 
learning rules. Rather it is by an understanding of and an empathy with the 
paradigmatic character that right conduct can be elucidated. Hence rules 
are secondary to character; they are ‘autobiographical footnotes which 
have been mistaken for life itself’.17 
Secondly, accepting morally paradigmatic character as primary entails 
conclusions concerning the structure of a moral system. In a deontological 
theory deductive connections hold between rules, empirical descriptions 
and practical judgements. Such a theory, however, is either deductively 
complete and substantially inadequate or is substantively adequate and 
deductively incomplete: one way or the other, Alderman argues, it fails. In 
place of deductive relationships virtue theorists propose the completeness 
and the substance of narrative relationships, the narrative relationships 
embodied in the life and example of a paradigmatic individual. The moral 
life, then, is one which conforms to that of the exemplar; moral dilemmas 
are resolved by emulating what the exemplar would do in the 
circumstances. Of course, different narratives compete for our allegiances 
but here the test is ‘which of these narratives tells the human tale most 
fully?’ To what extent, then, does this conception of moral theory 
illuminate Christian ethics? 
The precise interpretation of the biblical ideal of perfection is a matter of 
some controversy, but its centrality to Scriptures and to orthodox 
Christianity cannot be doubted. In the Old Testament the word ‘perfect’ is 
often used as meaning ‘whole’ or ‘sound’ or ‘true’. Following from this, in 
the New Testament ‘perfect’ denotes the completeness and blessedness of 
Christian experience. It is in this sense that Jesus used the word in 
Matthew’s Gospel when He affirms what might be regarded as the final 
consummation of Christian experience: ‘You therefore must be perfect 
(imperative future), as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Mt. 5:48). Out of 
the wide range of senses of perfection which we find at least two are of 
relevance to the theme of moral perfection. Their interrelations and the 
intersection of each with moral theory throw light on the significance of 
virtue ethics. They are what I shall call ‘developmental’ perfection and 
‘end-state’ perfection. 
Developmental perfection is a process described in the Pauline 17 Alderman, 
‘By Virtue of a Virtue’, 144. 
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epistles in terms of our putting off the old humanity and putting on the new 
(e.g. Eph. 4:22-24). Its inception is Christ’s injunction ‘take up your cross 
and follow me’ and made specific in uncompromising terms in His words 
to the rich young ruler: ‘If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess 
and give to the poor...and come, follow me’ (Mt. 19:21; Lk. 9:23). The 
culmination of the process thus commenced is the realisation of 
redemption when we are translated into His image or glory. In this sense 
perfection is a process; a process which has had a profound inspirational 
effect on the Christian church throughout the ages. Motivated by its vision 
there developed the ‘imitation’ literature of the medieval tradition, made 
famous in Thomas a Kempis’ On the Imitation of Christ and having its 
Anglican counterpart in William Law’s A Serious Call to a Devout and 
Holy Life. Here Jesus is the pattern, the ideal, the paradigm of the Christian 
life. Be conformed to Christ; do what Jesus would do in your situation; 
allow your life to be moulded into an image of the Master. 
However, there is a quite different form of perfection, what I have called 
‘end-state’ perfection which refers to a conception of perfection that is not 
in any way associated with ideas of moral or spiritual betterment. Rather it 
denotes the consummation of Christian experience in another order of 
existence. 
‘The perfect man’ Trench says, ‘is one who has attained his moral end and that for which he 
was intended, namely to be a man in Christ.’18 
This eschatological sense gains its supreme statement in Christ’s words, 
expressed in the future imperative, and towards which all Christian 
experience looks and moves: ‘You therefore must be perfect, as your 
heavenly Father is perfect.’ The aspiration of the Christian soul can go no 
further than this, the state summarised by the author of Hebrews as one in 
which: ‘the spirits of just men are made perfect’ (Heb. 12:23). The contrast 
between the two senses which I have described is most clearly expressed 
in Paul’s words which anticipate the spiritual completeness of Christian 
character: ‘When the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away’ (1 Cor. 
13:10). 
Perfection is this sense properly belongs to God and becomes available to 
human beings only in a derivative sense; not through their effort, but by 
virtue of a relationship with God which is made possible 
18 R.C. Trench, Synonyms of the New Testament (London: MacMillans, 1871). 
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by the redeeming work of Christ. It comes as a gift, not as an achievement 
or as a possession. All that God has and is, is perfect; and it is the 
relationship of the believer with God, and that alone, which will determine 
their share in this kind of perfection.19 
It is a central Christian belief that Jesus was a perfect man, that He is the 
paradigmatic figure, the true moral exemplar. In what then does His 
perfection consist? The answer, taken from His own words, and running 
through the Gospel narratives is this: His perfection lies in His complete 
obedience to the will of God the Father. At an early stage in the teaching of 
His disciples Jesus explains that ‘My food is to do the will of him who sent 
me’ (Jn. 4:34) and it is reaffirmed in His prayer to His father in 
Gethsemane: ‘nevertheless, not as I will but as thou wilt’ (Mt. 26:39). As a 
consequence obedience to the will of God is the badge of Christian 
discipleship: it is ‘he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven’ 
who will enter the kingdom (Mt. 7:21), it is ‘whoever does the will of my 
Father in heaven’ that is described as a member of Jesus’ family (Mt. 
12:50). End-state perfection and developmental perfection are best 
understood, therefore, in terms of human wills being transformed so as to 
be obedient to the will of God, culminating in a will that is wholly devoted 
to that end. It is the concept of doing the will of God which provides an 
all-comprehending unity to Christian perfection. 
The account of perfection in terms of obedience to God’s will is, however, 
what Bernard Williams would call a rather ‘thin’ conception of perfection. 
To what exactly does such obedience commit one? The answer, repeatedly 
given in the Gospels and in the Pauline epistles, is that obedience to God is 
expressed in a heart given over to unqualified love of others. Christ’s 
teaching on the mountain ends with an injunction to be perfect summing 
up a lengthy exposition of what is involved in loving not only ones 
neighbour but also ones enemies (Mt. 5:43-48). This principle is described 
as the fulfilment of the ‘royal law’ (Jas. 2:8 repeated in Rom. 13:10); and 
after exhorting his readers to love not ‘in word, neither in tongue, but in 
deed and in truth’, John adds: ‘And this is His commandment: that we 
should believe in the name of his son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as 
he gave us commandment’ (1 Jn. 3:18, 23). 
Christian perfection, therefore, finds its all-embracing unity in obedience 
to the Law of God, manifesting itself in unqualified love— 
19 I therefore hold that in this eschatological sense perfection is a gift freely and 
unconditionally given by God, and also that it is a goal towards which all Christians must 
strive, however well or badly. 
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with all the heart, soul and mind—for others (Mt. 22:37-40).  
This brief exploration of the foundations of Christian perfection enables us 
to review the perfectionist thesis implicit in Christian virtue ethics. The 
most striking feature of Christian perfection is the centrality to it of law, 
resulting in a remarkably close connection between deontic and aretic 
elements. If the Christian ideal of perfection is of a perfectly loving person 
then the ideal may equally well be expressed by reference to the principle 
of love. The perfect moral agent is the agent who has a psychologically 
appropriate 
disposition to act in a loving manner.  
The same point can be made slightly differently. Jesus’ life 
constitutes the paradigm for human conduct. But if it can be characterised, 
then the principles will be both descriptive and prescriptive. If so, then a 
recognition of Christ as the perfect moral exemplar is consistent with 
viewing Christian ethics as being constituted by rules and principles. 
It may be claimed that the fact that there is an intimate relationship 
between Christian perfection and the fulfilment of the law does not of 
itself establish that the divorce between virtue and principles is mistaken. 
Perhaps the Judaeo-Christian tradition is misguided and confused; perhaps 
it is the task of philosophical analysis to make the distinctions necessary to 
bring order into this jungle of religious and moral ideas. Well, this may be 
so, but philosophical arguments are needed to show this and if the 
perfectionist philosophical arguments are inconclusive then we are entitled 
to assume that the prima facie evidence provided by the Christian faith 
does not support the contentions of virtue ethics. This in fact is what I wish 
to argue and I will briefly indicate why I consider Alderman’s arguments 
to be inconclusive. 
Firstly, Alderman argues that in moral theory goods are secondary to 
perfections, because there are no goods such that they may not in some 
circumstances be morally undesirable whereas perfection suffers from no 
such defect. This seems to me to be inaccurate in a number of ways; partly 
because I do not think that there are any circumstances in which 
unqualified love is morally undesirable, partly because the necessary truth 
that what a morally perfect agent does will in all circumstances be morally 
good is not an informative account of the foundations of ethics. An 
analysis of moral perfection in terms of doing what is morally good fails in 
the same way that an account of one’s duty in terms of what one ought to 
do fails. What is needed is more than this necessary truth: we need an 
account which will guide 
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our actions and the best way in which Alderman’s account will do this is to 
introduce a basic principle such as love or a Kantian good will, thus 
collapsing his perfectionist theory into a principle based theory. 
Secondly, Alderman holds that moral rules are secondary to what a perfect 
agent would do because we learn moral truth primarily by example; and 
we only formulate rules at a later date. But this is an unconvincing 
argument. If my argument is correct then in learning by example one is 
ipso facto learning implicit moral rules. Even if Alderman is correct in his 
learning theory, nonetheless this seems to be an argument which if 
anything establishes the primacy of rules, because there is always a 
normative element built into the notion of choosing correctly, or doing 
something correctly. Surely there must be moral standards implicit in the 
claim that someone is getting behaviour right, which suggests that after all 
it is normative rules which are primary. 
Alderman’s arguments therefore do not undermine the considerable 
evidence which suggests that perfection and principles are inextricably 
linked, in excellence in general and in Christian perfection in particular. 
IV. The Communitarian Thesis 
The third form taken by the ethics of character is a stress on community: it 
is claimed that moral virtues including Christian virtues, are intelligible 
only within the context of certain culture- specific or historic-specific 
communities. 
Such a communitarian thesis holds that ethics, and a fortiori Christian 
ethics, must eschew the misguided desire to find and apply universal moral 
principles and must be located in specific historical or cultural contexts. 
What conclusions, positive and negative, does this communitarian thesis 
entail? Is it consistent with the universalism which many generations of 
apologists have claimed to find at the heart of the Christian message? In 
particular, is it true? 
These are questions which we must now address. Let us do so by looking 
first at what I have referred to as the supposedly universalistic character of 
Christian ethics and by asking if it is consistent with the particularist 
character of virtue ethics. 
From its inception a conspicuous, and at times a surprisingly unpopular 
feature of the Christian message has been its vigorously universal appeal. 
The Christian message, to ‘Jews or Gentiles...bond 
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or free’ (e.g. 1 Cor. 12:13), was a message which presupposed only the 
common humanity of its hearers: that the human race has undergone a 
moral catastrophe, the most serious consequence of which is our alienation 
from God, the ground of all goodness; that this moral catastrophe has its 
root in human pride; that the root cause of that moral catastrophe continues 
to create untold moral havoc in the lives of individuals and collectivities to 
this day; that the moral consequences of the catastrophe are both cognitive
—human moral discernment is fatally distorted, and conative—human 
motivation is morally impaired; that humans are unable by their own 
individual or collective efforts to ameliorate their predicament; that at 
infinite cost God has provided redemption, freely available to all who 
accept it in faith and repentance; that the fellowship to which acceptance 
of salvation provides access is indifferent to race, culture, social or 
historical situation. These central tenets of the Christian faith are universal 
in character. Nor has this inclusiveness been a mere aspiration. Over the 
centuries, and to a remarkable degree, the Christian message has continued 
to attract the rational allegiance of countless millions of people who are 
historically, geographically and culturally remote from one another. The 
church which Christ founded is one which knows no barriers—cultural, 
social, ethnic or economic: it owes allegiance to the same Lord and hence 
to a single set of values paradigmatically displayed by His life and death. 
Christians believe that the simple explanation for the universal appeal lies 
in the fact that all human beings have basic spiritual needs to which the 
Christian faith provides the answer. This, then, is what I understand by the 
universality of the Christian faith. 
This universality renders puzzling one aspect of the thesis that the 
Christian ethic is a virtue ethic and it is this puzzle that I shall now 
explore. 
A central feature of contemporary virtue ethics is its strong stress on the 
distinctness of community and on the role of community in shaping moral 
consciousness. According to Alisdair MacIntyre communities are not mere 
associations of individuals.20 Communities share common goals and ends 
which are not merely the sum of, or generalisations from, the private ends 
of the individuals who make up the communities. It is because 
communities share these common goals, because they are viewed as our 
goals rather than my goals by 
20 See especially Whose Justice? What Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988). 
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each member of the community, that a community acquires its distinctive 
identity. It is for this reason also that MacIntyre holds that the moral 
fragmentation which he detects in contemporary liberal society, with its 
stress on individual rights, can be mitigated in a social order reconstructed 
around the virtues which flourish in communities. 
MacIntyre expresses this communitarian thesis in terms of ‘traditions’ 
definable by reference to ‘socially embedded’ practical rationality. 
Rationality, MacIntyre explains, should not be thought of in the post-
enlightenment way as involving neutral and context- independent ways of 
judging the claims of competing theories, but as taking different forms in 
different traditions. Thus he describes Aristotle’s theory, Aquinas’ 
synthesis of Aristotelianism and Augustinian Christianity, the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Scottish tradition and modern liberalism each of 
which constitutes a distinct tradition. Each embodies ways of reasoning 
about conduct and shared methods of solving practical problems; each 
involves forms of life which are embedded in social and political 
institutions. Most importantly, MacIntyre argues, there are no ‘context—
free’ forms of argument and deliberation; there are no considerations 
which have force for all human beings as such, irrespective of social 
context. 
Granted the universalist aspects of the Christian faith that I have described 
above it is surprising to note how quickly contemporary expositors of 
Christian ethics have adopted a virtue ethic and to accept the specifically 
communitarian elements that I have highlighted. It is clear, however, that 
prominent defenders of Christian virtue ethics such as J.J. Kotva, S. 
Hauerwas and R. Bondi seem willing to accept these aspects of the virtue 
approach.21 
The communitarian elements of virtue ethics contain both negative and 
positive elements. The negative element is a rejection of universal and 
objective rules as embodied in the deontological tradition. The positive 
element involves the thesis that ethics is best understood in the narrative 
contexts of historically and culturally distinct communities. 
Kotva is explicit about the communitarian implications of his version of 
virtue ethics. Current ethical theory, he argues, ‘must pay considerable 
attention to the historically particular situation’. He goes on: 
21 J.J. Kotva, The Christian Case; S. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life (Texas, 
Trinity University Press, 1981); and R. Bondi, ‘The Elements of Character’, Journal of 
Religious Ethics 12 (1984), 201-218. 
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We are historical creatures, situated in specific historical and cultural contexts with 
particular beliefs, practices, and commitments. All knowledge, including moral knowledge, 
is historically grounded and at some level informed by the setting from within which it is 
known.22 
The conclusion which he draws from these innocuous observations— by 
what process of reasoning I know not—is that deontic ethics must be 
replaced by virtue ethics. He writes: 
It is now almost impossible to view moral rules as purely objective and unchanging... If 
nature and society are basically unchanging, then general principles are fine and we simply 
do whatever those before us did. But if nature and society change and develop, then we 
must attend to contextual variety and situational specificity.23 
The moral theory to which passages such as these would normally lead is 
moral relativism. And when Kotva invites us to accept virtue theory we are 
entitled to ask why historical and cultural diversity does not undermine the 
relevance of virtues. For example, if Kotva intends us to take his words at 
face value then we must construe him as holding that because late 20th 
century culture differs greatly from the culture of 1st century Rome a 
moral principle such as ‘one ought to be just’ or ‘one ought to be truthful’ 
cannot have application in both societies. I shall postpone for the moment 
discussion of whether these views are reasonable and concentrate on 
Kotva’s consistency. What is unclear is whether Kotva holds that virtues 
have application across historically and culturally remote periods; whether, 
to be specific, virtues such as justice or veracity have transcultural 
application. If they do, then I cannot understand why the relevant rule 
cannot also have application. If they do not, then why accept a virtue 
ethic? Why not defend an explicit version of moral relativism? 
A similar emphasis on community and virtue is to be found in the work of 
S. Hauerwas. Hauerwas’ ethics developed out of a dissatisfaction with two 
traditions, a legalism which made moral rules central to decision making 
and a situationalism which placed an undue emphasis on context in 
decision making; views which were influential in the middle decades of 
this century. The solution to the deficiencies of both was a theory which 
gave central place to character and the qualification of character by those 
narratively embedded reasons for action which are to be found in specific 
historical traditions. To his 
 . 22  Kotva, The Christian Case, p. 8.  
 . 23  Kotva, The Christian Case, p. 8.  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credit, Hauerwas does not shrink from the relativist implications of this 
account. Any search for objective and universal reasons is bound to fail, he 
says, because the concept of reason itself is tradition- dependent. He 
writes: 
The defence against a hard relativism cannot lie in the presumption that there is a ‘reason’ 
that can assure complete objectivity, for our rationality is always context dependent on the 
kind of men that we are or ought to be.24 
Clearly, then, the communitarian strand of virtue ethics represents a further 
attack on the existence of rational, objective moral standards, stresses the 
fragmentary nature of moral thought and defends the integrity of local 
culture-specific moral traditions. It seems to me to be important for 
Christians to challenge the strand of thought which I have just outlined, in 
particular its insistence that morality is fragmented and its claim that 
morality is necessarily internal to culturally-specific traditions. This I shall 
now briefly to do. 
Defenders of virtue ethics frequently assert that moral consensus is 
impossible between different cultures and that fragmentation is inevitable 
even within a single culture. However, the thesis is more often asserted 
than proven and attempts at detailed documentation are both unconvincing 
and highly selective. Consider the second point first. Far from being 
compartmentalised, different moral traditions display a remarkable degree 
of agreement over central values in contexts which are both culturally and 
historically remote. Thus although love, justice, veracity and beneficence 
may take very different forms in different settings nonetheless paradigm 
cases of each attract consensus to a remarkable degree. 
This point is strengthened when we reflect on the inconclusiveness of 
much of the evidence which attempts to document ethical diversity. Often 
the evidence of moral diversity is evidence only of variation in derivative 
rather than basic values; often it involves variation not in basic values but 
in the institutional expressions of those values; often it involves varying 
priority rankings of shared values rather than clashes between inconsistent 
values. These confusions have led to exaggerated conceptions of the 
fragmentation of morality and underpin the quasi-relativism of much 
contemporary virtue theory. 
The inherent difficulties in traditional relativist approaches to 
24 S. Hauerwas, ‘Obligation and Virtue Once More’, Journal of Religious Ethics 3 (1975), 
27-44. 
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ethics, which would seem to be difficulties also for communitarian forms 
of virtue ethics, are another reason to hesitate before accepting this 
approach.25 As is well known Plato considered all relativist approaches to 
be fundamentally incoherent, as being themselves examples of the very 
ahistorical and acultural theories whose intelligibility they were denying. It 
is because of such difficulties that recent writers who are attracted to virtue 
ethics have been consciously distancing themselves from the 
communitarian aspects of the thesis; and it seems to me that there is no 
reason why defenders of virtue ethics should necessarily adopt a 
communitarian perspective. The virtue ethic which Aristotle developed 
was not communitarian in the sense which we have been discussing and it 
seems strange to saddle virtue ethics with the relativist trappings which I 
have identified. 
These difficulties, which seem to challenge the account at a purely 
philosophical level, seem all the more serious when placed in a Christian 
context. In what conceivable sense are Christian virtues internal to a 
tradition? In what sense are they peculiar to a community? In attempting to 
answer these questions it may be helpful to distinguish between a strong 
and a weak sense in which the communitarian thesis may be construed in a 
theological context. On a weak construal the communitarian thesis may be 
understood as holding that Christian virtues are fully understood only by 
reference the their paradigmatic expression in the life and death of Jesus, 
in the definitive records of them that the Christian scriptures provide and 
against the background of the theological beliefs which underpin the moral 
theory of the Christian faith. If this is how it is construed then the 
communitarian thesis is quite consistent with the universalistic elements of 
the Christian message and it is a thesis which may reasonably be accepted. 
However a stronger construal can be envisaged. According to it Christian 
virtues are intelligible only within the context of culturally or historically 
discrete communities. This is the particularist interpretation which many 
contemporary defenders of virtue theory have in mind when they speak of 
traditions and, as I have already made clear, I see no good arguments for 
believing that this is true if conceived either descriptively—that is, as an 
account of what Christians have actually believed about their faith, or 
normatively—that is, as an account of how Christians should think of their 
faith. 
25 These issues are explored in detail in J. Annas, ‘MacIntyre on Traditions’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 18 (1989), 388-404; and J.B. Schneewind, ‘Virtue, Narrative and 
Community’, Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), 653-63. 
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If the line of argument that I have been developing in the later stages of 
this paper are correct then the search for foundations for Christian ethics 
should take the universality of morality rather than the particularity of 
morality as its starting point and should seek to give this universality both 
philosophical and theological expression. Very briefly I shall now sketch 
the broad outlines within which such accounts might most profitably be 
developed. 
Materials from which the project may readily gain philosophical 
expression are to be found in Nussbaum’s construal of Aristotle’s account 
of the virtues.26 Theory construction as conceived by Nussbaum a is a 
threefold procedure. Firstly, we isolate a sphere of human experience 
which figures more or less in any human life, and in connection with 
which any rational human being must be considered to have an interest. 
This constitutes a grounding experience for the relevant value. Secondly, 
we describe what it is to respond or perform well in this sphere, the 
description constituting an empirically ‘thin’ account of the value in 
question. Finally, we go on to explain how in a given social context this 
thin account can be given a more concrete specification, resulting in a full 
or empirically ‘thick’ account of the value. 
This account of ethical method provides a framework within which a 
plausible and distinctively Christian ethic can be worked out. For 
Christians the basic value is love, of God and of His creatures; and the 
principles of morality are those commanded by a perfectly loving God, 
gaining their supreme exemplification in the life and death of Jesus. 
The account of ethics which I have given is neutral between a deontic and 
a virtue ethic. Indeed if the argument of the present paper is correct this 
distinction is itself a questionable one since virtues and rules are intimately 
interconnected. It should be noted that Nussbaum develops this account of 
ethical method in the form of an explicitly virtue ethic thus showing that 
there is no necessary connection between virtue ethics and the quasi-
relativism which characterises many Christian and philosophical 
expositions of virtue ethics. A virtue ethic, then, can be invoked to provide 
a rational critique of existing traditions and practices from the point of 
view of virtues which are ahistorical and transcultural. 
The distinctively theological expression of this account of ethics 
26 M.C. Nussbaum, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 13 (1988), 32-53. 
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takes the form of reviving the ancient and time-honoured doctrine of 
common grace,27 according to which universal basic moral truths are 
available to humans naturally, that is independently of the revelation to be 
found in Scripture or in the life of Christ. 
As is well known the theory of common grace has given rise to immense 
theological controversy. When Pelagians defended the theory by pointed to 
the virtues of the heathen who were often merciful, chaste and temperate, 
Augustine emphasised human inability to achieve virtue and argued that 
since the heathen actions in question were the acts of unregenerate and 
sinful persons they were without merit. Others interpreted the doctrine as 
claiming that Christ by His atoning blood merited certain blessings for the 
impenitent and reprobate; a view which others denied with equal 
conviction. I shall not explore these issues. When I refer to common grace 
I mean merely a minimal epistemological thesis to the effect that Scripture 
and human experience amply testify to the fact that certain basic moral 
truths are immediately and spontaneously known by any rational human 
mind. It is this form of common grace which Paul speaks of when he says 
of the Gentiles, who do by their nature the things of the law, that ‘they 
show the word of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing 
witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else 
excusing them.’ And this is again indirectly affirmed when Paul says, 
speaking of those who give free vent to their wicked lives, that though they 
knew the truth of God and His nature they hindered it by their 
unrighteousness and exchanged it for a lie. This epistemological view 
concerning the scope of rational human endowments is independent of the 
other moral and motivational theses concerning common grace which I 
have mentioned. 
An ethic can be invoked, therefore, along the lines which I have suggested, 
which will provide a rational critique of existing traditions and practices 
from the point of view of virtues which are ahistorical and transcultural 
and in no way dependent on the quasi-relativism which characterises 
contemporary virtue ethics. 
V. Conclusion. 
In this essay I have identified three theses—a priority thesis, a 
27 For a recent restatement of this doctrine see for example L. Berkhof Systematic Theology 
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1984), pp. 432-46. 
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perfectionist thesis and a communitarian thesis—which are central to 
contemporary virtue ethics. These theses, as has been shown, have been 
appropriated and defended by advocates of specifically Christian versions 
of virtue ethics. I have contended that the arguments for this radical 
departure from traditional ethics are unsustainable. Most importantly, I 
have challenged the independence thesis, the thesis that aretic and deontic 
moralities are distinct and irreducible. If this argument is successful then 
the attack on traditional deontic ethics collapses and philosophical 
reflection can return, undistracted, to its proper object, namely the study of 
the basic principles of Christian ethics, their structure and their 
relationship to other theological doctrines. This is not to say that a study of 
moral virtue may not enlighten Christian ethics in important ways. It may, 
but the enlightenment will be of a very different kind than that envisaged 
by contemporary writers in the field of Christian virtue ethics. 
Finally, the implications of this argument for an understanding of the 
history of ethics should be noted. One of the most unfortunate features of 
much virtue ethics has been a tendency, resulting from oversimplification, 
to construct an unbridgeable gap between Aristotle, the representative of 
virtue theory, and Kant, the representative of the deontic tradition. On the 
position defended in this paper the views of virtue which these writers take 
are remarkable similar; which is what one would expect once one’s 
confidence in the independence thesis has been undermined. 
